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ADOPTION-INTESTATE SUCCESSION-The Denial of a
Stepparent Adoptee's Right to Inherit from an Intestate
Natural Grandparent: In Re Estate of Holt

INTRODUCTION

Holt 1

the New Mexico Supreme Court denied a
In In re Estate of
grandchild, Tammy Brady, the right to inherit from her intestate natural
paternal grandmother because Tammy had been adopted by her stepfather
prior to her grandmother's death. The court ruled that the fact that the
adoption occurred after her natural father's death did not except Tammy
from the general rule that adoption severs all inheritance rights between
an adopted child and the natural parents.'
Provisions in the Uniform Probate Code3 and the Revised Uniform
Adoption Act4 allow a child to inherit through her deceased parent, despite
adoption by her stepparent. New Mexico, however, has adopted neither
of these specific provisions. The exceptions proposed in the Uniform
Probate Code and the Revised Uniform Adoption Act recognize that policy
1. 95 N.M. 412, 622 P.2d 1032 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Holt].
2. See discussion of N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978) infra, at text accompanying note
13.
3. Unif. Probate Code, § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 287 (1975) [hereinafter cited as U.P.C.] provides:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must
be established to determine succession, by, through, or from a person, . . . an
adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural parents
except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on
the relationship between the child and either natural parent.
(Emphasis added). Prior to 1975 this section excepted only the natural parent married to the adopting
parent. The section concluded "between the child and that natural parent" (emphasis added). New
Mexico adopted the earlier version of "that natural parent." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-109(A) (1978).
4. Revised Unif. AdoptionAct, § 14, 9 U.L.A. 17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as R.U.A.A.] provides:
(a)(2) A final decree of adoption [has the effect of creating] the relationship of parent
and child between petitioner and the adopted individual, as if the adopted individual
were a legitimate blood descendant of the petitioner, for all purposes including
inheritance....
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), if a parent of a child dies
without the relationship of parent and child having been previously terminated and
a spouse of the living parent thereafter adopts the child, the child's right of inheritance
from or through the deceased parent is unaffected by the adoption.
Subsection (b) was not in the original version of the Uniform Adoption Act, but was added in the
Revised Act of 1969. Whether a state has enacted this exception often depends upon when the state
adopted the Uniform Adoption Act. The New Mexico exception, adopted in 1971, contains ambiguous
wording: "[l]f an individual dies before the parent-child relationship between the deceased and any
other individual is terminated, no subsequent adoption proceedings affect the right of inheritance,
if any, through or from the deceased individual." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-7-15(B)(2) (1978).
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considerations supporting sealed adoption records and a complete substitution of family relationships are not often applicable to stepparent
adoptions. Because the majority of adoptions granted in New Mexico
each year are to persons related to the child (parent/stepparent or other
relative), 5 the determination of whether adoption always severs intestate
inheritance rights is a vital question.
This Note reviews the New Mexico court's analysis of Holt and compares that analysis with the model provisions of the uniform adoption
and probate codes and with decisions and statutes of other states. The
focus is on the historical development of adoption policies and adoptees'
inheritance rights, and on the need for statutory change in New Mexico's
intestacy laws.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
The facts of Holt were not disputed. In 1971, Tammy Anne Brady's
natural father died. In 1975, her natural mother's second husband, Steven
Brady, adopted her. In 1979, her paternal grandmother, Ruby Holt, died
intestate.6
The District Court of Eddy County entered an order of intestacy and
a determination of heirship in favor of Ruby Holt's seven surviving
children. Tammy Brady, by and through her parent and natural guardian,
Ann Holt Brady, petitioned the court to set aside its order and to recover
estate assets distributed to these seven heirs. The district court granted
her summary judgment. The Commerce Bank and Trust Company, personal representative of Ruby Holt's estate, appealed. 7 The New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed, denying Tammy Brady's right to inherit from
her intestate natural grandmother.8
5. In 1980, an estimated 55% (600 out of 1085) of the adoptions granted in New Mexico were
to natural parent/stepparent families. 1980 N.M. Human Services Dep't, Soc. Services Div. Ann.
Rep. The estimated 600 includes stepparent adoptions where one natural parent was deceased as
well as where the natural parents had been divorced. By contrast, in 1965, only 39% of all adoptions
were by natural parent/stepparent families (379 out of 979). Adoptions in New Mexico, 1965 N.M.
Dep't Public Welfare, Div. Child Welfare Ann. Rep. This change suggests that when formulating
adoption policies, the legislature should consider stepparent adoptions equally as important as adoptions by an entirely "new" set of parents.
The 1965 report shows that in 54 cases of stepparent adoptions, one natural parent was dead. In
260 cases the natural parents were divorced, and the non-custodial parent consented to the adoption.
No similar breakdown is available for 1980. The R.U.A.A. exception would permit inheritance only
in the relatively small number of cases where a natural parent is deceased prior to the stepparent
adoption. Tammy Brady's situation in Holt would fall within this exception. See supra note 4. The
U.P.C. exception would permit inheritance whether the stepparent adoption occurred after either the
death of one natural parent or the divorce of the natural parents. See supra note 3.
6. 95 N.M. at 413, 622 P.2d at 1033.
7. Id.
8. Id.at 415, 622 P.2d at 1035.
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Brady argued that although N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-109(A) (1978)
denies the right of a natural parent to inherit from the adopted child, the
statute does not expressly deny the right of the adopted child to inherit
through her natural father when his death occurs before her adoption. 9
The pertinent language of the statute provides that to establish a relationship of parent and child for intestate inheritance by, through or from
a person:
A. an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of
the natural parents, and in the event of the death of the adopted
child, his estate shall pass as provided by law for natural born children
of the same family, all to the exclusion of the natural parents of such
child .... o
Brady argued that a strict construction of the statute would not bar her
from inheriting through her deceased natural father."I The court found,
however, that it was the "clear meaning" of the statute that without
exception all legal rights between natural parent and adopted child are
severed when the child is adopted.' 2
Brady further argued that N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978),
which establishes the effect of adoption on inheritance rights, preserved
her right to inherit through her father. The statute states: "if an individual
dies before the parent-child relationship between the deceased and any
other individual is terminated, no subsequent adoption proceedings affect
the right of inheritance, if any, through or from the deceased individual." 11
Brady argued that the statute allowed inheritance through or from a deceased parent when the parent dies before the parent-child relationship
is severed by adoption.' 4 The court rejected this argument and construed
the word "individual" in the statute to refer to the grandmother, not to
Brady's deceased natural father. Thus, adoption prior to the grandmother's death severed Brady's inheritance rights through her father. ' The
9. Id. at 413-14, 622 P.2d at 1033-34.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-109(A) (1978).
11. 95 N.M. at 414, 622 P.2d at 1034. A strict construction would require any change from the
consanguinal pattern of intestate inheritance to be expressly set out in the descent and distribution
statutes. In N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-109 (1978), the right of a natural parent to inherit from the
adopted child is expressly cut off, but the statute does not state the converse, that an adopted child
cannot inherit from or through the natural parents. Thus in a strict construction of the statute, Brady's
right to inherit from or through her natural father is not expressly prohibited. A liberal construction
would construe the adoption statutes with the intestacy statutes and seek to fulfill the legislative
intent to benefit the adopted child. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by andfrom the Adopted Child,
28 Wash. U.L.Q. 221, 234-37 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kuhlmann).
12. 95 N.M. at 414, 622 P.2d at 1034.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978) (emphasis added).
14. 95 N.M. at 414, 622 P.2d at 1034.
15. Id.
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court stressed that the estate to be distributed by intestacy was the grandmother's, not the natural father's, and that at the time of the grandmother's
death, Brady had already been adopted.' 6 A contrary decision, the court
noted, would have resulted in a dual inheritance because the child would
inherit through both the natural father's bloodline and the adoptive father's
bloodline. 7I
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the New Mexico public
policies of (1) treating the adopted child as the child of the adopting
parents for all purposes and of (2) terminating all legal rights and obligations between the natural parents and the child.' 8 The court found that
stepparent adoption did not justify an exception to the general treatment
of adopted children's inheritance rights. 19
DISCUSSION
A. Reconciling Adoption Laws with Descent and DistributionStatutes
To understand the court's choices in Holt, a survey of the piecemeal
development of adoptees' inheritance rights is necessary. Developments
in adoption policy and laws prompted changes in the intestacy statutes.
Although there appears to be a general trend, the changes have not been
consistent from state to state. In addition, legislatures have not always
made choices between intestacy policies and evolving adoption policies
in the best interests of the adoptee. 2" The underlying conflict, as stated
in an early New Mexico case, has not changed: "We are confronted with
the task of considering the statutes of descent and distribution and determining how far we may read into that statute the provisions of the
statutes of adoption." 2 '
Development of adoption law in New Mexico has followed the general
national trend.2" Initially, the adoption statutes reflected the concern that
natural parents should not retain any legal control or management of the
adopted child.2 3 The first statutes did not mention the effects of adoption
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Holt court reaffirmed the relevant public policy as first stated in Delaney v. First Nat'l
Bank in Albuquerque, 73 N.M. 192, 386 P.2d 711 (1963).
19. 95 N.M. at 414-15, 622 P.2d at 1034-35.
20. For a thorough survey of the development of adoption law in Europe and America, see
Binavince, Adoption & the Law of Descent and Distribution:A Comparative Study & a Proposal
for Model Registration, 51 Cornell L.Q. 152 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Binavince]. Kuhlmann,
supra note 11, surveys the stages of development in American adoption law.
21. Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 59, 240 P. 991, 993 (1925).
22. See Binavince, supra note 20, at 158-79; Kuhlmann, supra note 11, at 224-32.
23. "The parents and relatives of an adopted child are from the time of its adoption relieved of
all parental duties toward and all responsibility for the child so adopted, and shall have no right to
or control over it." 1893 N.M. Laws ch. 32, § 13.
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on inheritance rights.24 Early cases and statutes often described adoption
as a contract between the state and the adopting parents to support and
maintain the child.25
Early adoption statutes did not expressly contradict the consanguinity
principle of intestate succession. Through the first half of this century,
courts generally held that the adopted child inherited from and through
the natural bloodline. 6 Gradually, amendments to the adoption statutes
severed all of the adoptee's inheritance rights by, from, and through the
natural bloodline. 27 By the 1970's in many states, including New Mexico,
the legislatures had completely substituted the adopted bloodline for the
natural bloodline.
The earliest inheritance provisions for adoptees did not remove the
2
adopted child from the natural bloodline, but granted additional rights. 1
The adopted child could inherit from both the natural and the adopting
parents. In later statutes the adopting parents could inherit from the adopted
24. The only legal effect usually provided for was the changing of the child's name. See 1893
N.M. Laws ch. 32, § 12.
For the purpose of reducing the number and curtailing the expense of main25.
tenance of orphans now or hereafter in said orphanage, any person found competent by the court may adopt any orphan in said orphanage, by filing [sic] a
petition therefor in the district court .. . .Any time prior to the filing of any
such petition, any orphan in said orphanage, with the consent of the governing
authority of said orphanage, may be adopted by any competent person, by contracts
of adoption entered into between said governing authority and the person desiring
to adopt such orphan .. . .No child adopted hereunder shall thereafter be maintained in said orphanage at public expense.
1921 N.M. Laws ch. 192, §4.
South Dakota is the only state still adhering to this contract theory. See Harrell v. McDonald, 90
S.D. 482, 242 N.W.2d 148 (1976).
26. In Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 240 P. 991 (1925), the adopting parent predeceased the
adopted child, who died intestate. The father of the adopting parent and the child's natural mother,
who had consented to the adoption, both claimed heirship. The New Mexico court held that the
child's estate should pass to his natural mother: "[in] our descent and distribution statute . ..the
dominant idea of blood relationship is the lodestone of inheritable capacity, except where changed
by statute." 31 N.M. at 60, 240 P. at 993.
Some state statutes still do not sever the adopted child from the natural bloodline for purposes of
intestate inheritance. See infra note 52. The state legislatures of Texas and Utah have been criticized
for not following the recent trend of complete substitution of the adoptive line for the natural bloodline.
See, Note, Inheritance Rights of Parties to the Adoption of a Child: Conflicts Between the Texas
Family Code and the Texas ProbateCode, 28 Baylor L. Rev. 432 (1976); Note, Intestate Succession
and Adoption in Utah: A Need for Legislation, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 56. Each commentator points out
the inequities imposed on the adopted child as a result of out-moded legislative attitudes.
27. Binavince, supra note 20, at 173-79; Kuhlmann, supra note 11,at 224-27.
28. Kuhlmann, supra note 11,at 225-27, 232. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §535
(1964) (repl. 1981):
If the person adopted died intestate, his property acquired by himself or by devise,
bequest, gift or otherwise before or after such adoption from his adopting parents
or from the kindred of said adopting parents shall be distributed according to title
18, the same as if born to said adopting parents in lawful wedlock; and property
received by devise, bequest, gift or otherwise from his natural parents or kindred
shall be distributed . . . as if no act of adoption had taken place.
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child.29 In some instances, the adopted child could inherit from the adopting parents but not from the adopted kindred.30 The natural parents' right
to inherit from the adopted child was cut off, but the adopted child retained
the right to inherit from and through the natural parents."' The most recent
major change, the complete substitution of the adoptive line for the natural
bloodline, follows the policy of giving the adopted child a completely
new start in a new family group.32 This has become the general rule.
Current New Mexico law treats the adopted child as the legitimate blood
descendant of the adopting parents for all purposes." All rights from the
29. The New Mexico legislature first mentioned adoptees' inheritance rights in an act providing
for adoption of adults: "Upon the granting of the adoption, the adult person shall take the family
name of the person adopting and shall be entitled to all the rights, including the right to inherit as
now provided by law, of the natural child of such adopting person." 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 62, § 7.
In 1945, the legislature added a provision to the statutes of Descent and Distribution to enable
adopted children to inherit: "Whenever a child has been legally adopted, such child shall inherit
from the adopting parents, and each of them, to the same extent as if he were a natural child of the
adopting parents." 1945 N.M. Laws ch. 16, § 1.In 1951, the legislature amended the 1945 act to
include the right of the adopting parents to inherit from the adopted child. 1951 N.M. Laws ch. 62,
§1.
30. In an early case, Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906), the judge, after
reviewing the history of adoption, concluded that in common law jurisdictions '[iInheritance flows
naturally with the blood" unless expressly denied by statute. The case held that adoption granted
98 S.W. at 587.
inheritance rights from, but not through, the adopted parents. Id. at -,
The U.P.C. Committee, recognizing the resistance to full inheritance rights for the adopted child,
provided a choice in the 1958 Model Code section on the effect of the final adoption decree:
(1)After the final decree of adoption is entered the relation of parent and child
and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of
child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child and the adoptive
parents adopting such child [and the kindred of the adoptive parents]. From the
date of the final decree of adoption, the child shall be entitled to inherit real and
personal property from [and through] the adoptive parents in accordance with the
statutes of descent and distribution, and the adoptive parents shall be entitled to
inherit real and personal property from and through the child in accordance with
said statutes.
U.P.C. § 12 (1958). For a detailed discussion of why California changed to a complete substitution
of the adopted family line for the natural family line, see In re Garey's Estate, 214 Cal. App. 2d
39, 29 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The court in Garey denied the right of a grandchild
adopted after the death of her father to inherit from her intestate natural paternal grandmother.
31. This question was litigated in New Mexico in In re Estate of Shehady, 83 N.M. 311, 491
P.2d 528 (1971). See infra, text accompanying notes 35-38.
32. See Smith & Fawsett, FloridaAdoption and Intestate Succession Laws: A Legal Paralogism,
24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 603, 606-608 (1972) thereinafter cited as Smith & Fawsett]. Florida law has
changed since the authors wrote that article. See infra note 53.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15 (1978) provides:
A. A judgment of adoption, whether issued by the court of this state or any other
place, has the following effect as to the matters within the jurisdiction of or before
the court: . . . (2) to create the relationship of parent and child, between the
petitioner and the individual to be adopted, as if the individual adopted were a
legitimate blood descendant of the petitioner for all purposes, including inheritance
and applicability of statutes, documents and instruments, whether executed before
or after the adoption is adjudged, which do not expressly exclude an adopted
individual from their operation or effect.
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and
natural bloodline are severed. At issue in Holt was the meaning
34
applicability of New Mexico's exception to this general rule.
B. Recent New Mexico Precedent and the Holt Decision
Prior to Holt, the New Mexico Supreme Court in In re Estate of
Shehady,35 had considered the right of children adopted by their stepfather
to inherit from their intestate natural father. In Shehady both natural
parents had remarried. The stepfather adopted the children nine years
after their natural parents were divorced. The natural father died intestate
twenty-eight years later, survived by his second wife, but by no other
natural or adopted children. 36 The court noted that New Mexico statutes
expressly provided that an adopted child was not prohibited from succeeding to the estate of the natural parent." Notwithstanding those statutory provisions, the court held that the adopted children could not inherit
from their natural father. The court chose modem adoption policy over
consanguinity theory, affirming the complete substitution of the adopted
relationship for the natural relationship and the severance of all legal ties
between natural parents and adopted child, even where adoption was by
a stepparent. 38
The issues distinguishing Holt from Shehady were two. The first difference was that the adoption in Holt occurred after the natural parent's
death. The second was the possible applicability to Holt of N.M. Stat.
Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978)." The Holt court resolved both issues by
reasserting that adoption severs all legal rights, including inheritance.
Because the paternal grandmother in Holt died after Brady's adoption,
the court held that Brady could not inherit from that natural bloodline.
To decide otherwise, the court said, would have allowed Brady a dual
inheritance from and through her stepfather and through her natural father.'
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978), quoted supra, text accompanying note 13.
35. 83 N.M. 311, 491 P.2d 528 (1971).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 313, 419 P.2d at 530. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§22-2-10, 22-2-19, 29-1-17 (1953). The
current statutes, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-7-15, 45-2-109 (1978), although substantially different in
wording, did not change the treatment of the adopted child as the natural child of the adopting
parents for all purposes, including intestate inheritance.
38. 83 N.M. at 311-14, 491 P.2d at 528-31.
39. 95 N.M. at 413-14, 622 P.2d at 1033-34. The legislature enacted N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-715(B)(2) (1978) as part of a comprehensive adoption act which repealed N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-22 to -19 (1953). The act became effective July 1, 1971. Shehady was decided under the 1953 adoption
statutes.
40. The court allowed "a familiar rule of statutory construction that all of the provisions of a
statute, together with other statutes in pan materia, must be read together to ascertain the legislative
intent." 95 N.M. at 414, 622 P.2d at 1034 (quoting Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 402, 405
P.2d 405, 406 (1967)). The court concluded that the legislative intent of all the adoption statutes
was to substitute completely the adopting family for the natural family line. 95 N.M. at 415, 622
P.2d at 1035.
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The court's construction of Section 40-7-15(B)(2) (1978) severely limits its applicability as an exception. In pertinent part, the statute provides
that "if an individual dies before the parent-child relationship between
the deceased and any other individual is terminated, no subsequent adoption proceedings affect the right of inheritance, if any, through or from
the deceased individual." 4 ' According to the Holt decision, adoption of
a child after one natural parent's death severs intestate inheritance through
that parent. Thus, only heirship from the deceased parent's estate is
preserved. The court's interpretation, in effect, rewords the statute to
state: "If a parent dies before the parent-child relationship is terminated,
no subsequent adoption proceedings affect the right of inheritance, if any,
from the deceased parent but inheritance through that parent is severed."
In Holt, the court noted that In re Estate of Topel,42 a Wisconsin case
cited with approval in Shehady, involved a fact pattern identical to Brady's
case. In Topel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied heirship to three
grandchildren who were adopted after their natural father's death but
prior to the intestate death of their paternal grandfather.43 The Holt court
found the Wisconsin statute similar in intent and effect to the New Mexico
statute.44
The Topel case was decided in 1966. In 1969, the Wisconsin legislature
revised the probate code and added a specific exception which permitted
inheritance by the adopted child in circumstances like those in Topel.
The legislative commentary following the revised Wisconsin statute justified the change, reasoning that usual adoption policies did not apply to
stepparent adoptions: "preserving inheritance rights by the adopted child
in proving heirship or in
is not likely to present any difficulties either
46
embarrassment to the adoptive parents."
The Wisconsin exception, similar to that of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act provisions, 47 recognizes that adoption by a stepparent is different
from adoption by a completely new set of parents. Adoption records are
not sealed and secrecy is not necessary to protect the adopting family
48
from interference or custody challenges by the natural parents or kin.
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-15(B)(2) (1978).
42. 32 Wis.2d 223, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966).
43. Id.
44. 95 N.M. at 415, 622 P.2d at 1035.
45. Wis. Stat. Ann. §851.51(2)(b) (West 1971). With this statute, the Wisconsin legislature
reversed the Topel precedent. The commentary to the statute clarified the legislative intent to treat
the stepparent adoptee differently from the child adopted by a new set of parents. See infra text
accompanying note 46.
46. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 851.51 (West 1971), comment (1969).
47. See supra note 4.
48. The Ohio legislature has also adopted a statutory exception that reverses previous court
decisions. In Frantz v. Florence, 72 Ohio Law Abstract 222, 131 N.E.2d 630 (1954), the Ohio Court
of Common Pleas denied the right of an adopted child to take by intestate succession from his natural
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The position of other states on whether to except a stepparent adoptee
from the general rule on inheritance severance is evenly divided.4 9 Onehalf of the jurisdictions completely sever all inheritance rights between
the adopted child and the natural parents and kindred, substituting full
inheritance from and through the adopting parents.5 Adoption does not
sever the right of the adopted child to inherit from and through the natural
parents in ten states. 1 In fifteen states, a statutory exception permits an
adopted child to inherit through or from a natural parent after adoption
by the spouse of the other natural parent. 52
paternal grandfather where the child had been adopted by his stepfather after the death of his natural
father. The court commented that "While [severance of inheritance from and through natural parent]
is a harsh rule under the circumstances herein, the social purpose or lack of purpose of the enactment
of the statute by the Legislature is not for the consideration of this Court." Id. at -, 131 N.E.2d
at 632. In 1977 Ohio amended its adoption statutes, conforming to the U.R.A.A. exception. See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3107.15 (Page 1980).
49. See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 631 (1974).
50. The pertinent statutes in these twenty-five jurisdictions are: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §8-117
(1975); Cal. Prob. Code § 257 (West 1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-11-109, 19-4-113 (1973); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 12, §508 (Repl. 1979); D.C. Ann. § 16-312 (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 560:2-109(l)
(Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 16-1509 (1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-2-8 (Bums 1972); Kan. Stat.
Ann. §59-2103 (1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.520(2) (Baldwin 1981); Md. Est. & Trusts Code
Ann. § 1-207(a) (1974); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.110 (1980); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-13
(1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. §453.090 (Vernon 1977); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-8-125 (1979); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §30-2309 (Supp. 1974); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 127.160 (1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 170-B:20
(1978); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117 (McKinney 1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. §29-17 (Repl. 1976); S.C.
Code § 15-45-130 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-126 (Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §448
(1974); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.140 (1961); W. Va. Code § 48-4-5 (1976).
51. Ala. Code §43-4-3 (1975); I11.Ann. Stat. ch. 1101/2, §2-4 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (see In re
Estate Cregar, 30 Ill. App. 3d 798, 333 N.E.2d 540 (1975)); Iowa Code Ann. §633.223 (West
Supp. 198 1) (see Comment, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Intestate Natural Parents, 55
Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1970)); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 214 (West supp. 1982); Okla. Stat. tit. 10 § 60.16
(West Supp. 1978) (See Meadow Gold Dairies v. Oliver, 535 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1975)); R.I.
Gen. Laws §15-7-17 (1970); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §25-6-16 (1976); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 15.07 (Vernon 1975) (see Go Int'l, Inc. v. Lewis, 601 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980));
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-109 (Repl. 1977); Wyo. Stat. § 2-4-107(a)(i) (1977).
Although the statutes of Illinois, Iowa, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah do not state that the
adopted child retains inheritance rights from and through both natural parents, the respective state
courts have held that unless expressly denied by the statute, intestate inheritance rights are not severed
by adoption.
52. The states which follow the Revised Uniform Adoption Act allow the adopted child to inherit
from and through the deceased natural parent if the adoption occurred after the natural parent's
death: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-215(2)(b) (Supp. 1981); Fla. Stat. §63.172(2) (1976); Ga. Code Ann.
§74-413(b) (1981); Minn. Stat. Ann. §259.29(la) (West 1982); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-15-14(2)
(Repi. 1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.15(B) (Page 1980); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 851.51(2)(b) (West
1971). A few states qualify the R.U.A.A. provision by specifying that death of a natural parent
need occur while the parents are married (thus excluding situations in which the parents are divorced
and then one natural parent dies): Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-64(8) (West Supp. 1982) (see Rauhut
v. Short, 26 Conn. 55, 212 A.2d 827 (1965)); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, §7 (West Supp.
1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. §112.175(2)(b) (Repl. 1979).
The U.P.C. exception does not require that one natural parent be deceased, stating that adoption
by the spouse of one natural parent does not sever inheritance rights by, from or through either
natural parent. Alaska has adopted both the R.U.A.A. exception, Alaska Stat. §20.15.130(b) (1975),
and the U.P.C. exception, Alaska Stat. § 13.11.045 (Supp. 1976). Both Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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C. Adoption Policy Considerations
The variations in state law reflect the extent to which state legislatures,
prompted by changing attitudes toward adopted children, have modified
the descent and distribution statutes. The kind of child to be adopted has
changed since adoption laws were first implemented. At first, the adopted
child was the orphaned or abandoned child who needed a home.53 Later
the adopted child was an unwanted or illegitimate child who was "given
up" for placement in a new family with all rights and advantages of a
natural child within the adopted line. 4 Now, the adopted child is, increasingly, the stepchild. 5
The Revised Uniform Adoption Act and Uniform Probate Code exceptions, 6 enacted in some states, raise the fundamental question of
whether the policy of cutting off all inheritance from the natural bloodline
is appropriate for the large number of stepparent adoptees. 7 The reasons
given for complete severance of all connections with the natural bloodline
are: (1) the necessity of sealed records to protect the child and the adopting
parents from any interference by the natural kin and to protect the natural
parents from public exposure and possible embarrassment; (2) the importance of insuring a new life for the adopted child by replacing all ties
to the natural parents with complete integration into the adopted family;
estates if a search must
and (3) the practical difficulty of settling personal
58
be made for children put up for adoption.
With stepparent adoptions, however, no need for secrecy exists because
the child is not being placed in a new family. 9 The child usually is not
an infant but is old enough to have established a relationship with the
natural parent's relatives. This relationship is often maintained after the
tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) (Repl. 1981) and Virginia, Va. Code § 64.1-5-1 (Supp. 1968), follow the U.P.C.
Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-30(A) (West 1976), adoption by the spouse of a natural parent with
consent of the other natural parent does not sever inheritance rights through that parent; the statute
is silent regarding adoption after a natural parent's death. Under 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §2108
(Purdon Supp. 1981), if an adoption has occurred after the death or divorce of a parent, a limited
exception applies in distributing "the estate of a natural kin, other than the natural parent, who has
maintained a family relationship with the adopted person."
53. See supra note 25.
54. Kuhlmann, supra note 11, at 247-48; Binavince, supra note 20, at 180-81.
55. See Comment, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C.D. L.
Rev. 604 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Stepparent Custody], for a discussion of the impact of serial
marriages on stepparent adoptions.
56. See supra notes 3 and 4.
57. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-109 comment (1975).
58. See Smith & Fawsett, supra note 32, at 622-23; In re Estate of Topel, 32 Wis.2d 223, 226,
145 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1966); Comment, The Adopted Child: Inheritancefrom Intestate Natural
Parents, supra note 51, at 743-45.
59. StepparentCustody, supra note 55, suggests the term "re-made" family for remarriages with
adoption of stepchildren.
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natural parent's death (or after the natural parents' divorce). 6 The special
concerns for the stepparent adoptee generally have not been included in
broad policy statements supporting total severance with the natural kin,
stepchild
even though commentators have recognized that adoption of the
6
may also have important psychological effects on that child. 1
Equitable treatment under the intestacy statutes for natural as well as
for adopted children is another factor the courts must consider. In Holt,
the policy decision to deny Brady a dual inheritance was crucial to the
New Mexico court's holding. 6 Dual inheritance occurs when inheritance
through the natural bloodline is not severed, and the adopted child inherits
from both adopted and natural family lines. Usually the question of dual
inheritance arises from one of two fact patterns. The first is where a
relative, such as a grandparent, adopts the child of deceased parents, then
the relative dies intestate, and the child inherits in the dual capacity of
adopted child and natural grandchild.63 The second is where an adopted
the right to inherit from both natural and
child is not expressly denied
64
adopted parents by statute.
Prior to Holt, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Shehady quoted with
approval the position of the Missouri Supreme Court on denying dual
60. For a vigorous policy debate on whether an exception for a stepparent adoptee should be
granted under statutes that completely sever the right of the adopted child to inherit from the natural
line, see In re Estate of Donnelly, 81 Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972). In a 5-to-4 decision,
the Washington Supreme Court denied an adopted child the right to inherit from her intestate
grandparents when she had been adopted after her natural father's death. The majority opinion,
urging liberal construction, chose the broad legislative objective of a fresh start for the adoptee over
the importance of consanguinity theory. The dissent, in a strict construction, argued that the statute
did not expressly bar the grandchild, and because the fresh start adoption policy did not apply here,
criticized the denial of inheritance as inequitable:
The new family relationship created by the marriage and adoption presented
none of the circumstances of an adoption designed in law to cut off all familial
and legal relationships with the adopted child's natural mother nor her grandparents
either. The grandchild continued to live with her natural mother and adoptive
father presumably with the full knowledge of her grandfather, whose lineal descendant she remained. None of the factors upon which the legislature legislated
to seal the records of adoption against the grandfather existed here.
81 Wash. 2d at 436, 502 P.2d at 1169. A commentator on Donnelly suggested that the grandchild
and her grandparents retained a de facto, if not legal, relationship. Note, An Adopted Grandchild
May Not Inherit From Intestate Natural Grandparents, 8 Gonz. L. Rev. 384 (1973).
61. Stepparent Custody, supra note 55, at 609-12.
62. The court stated:
Tammy Brady's adoption cut off the right to inherit from her grandmother. Otherwise, under appellee's construction, Tammy Brady would be allowed a dual
inheritance, once from her natural father's bloodline, and again from her adoptive
It was not intended by the legislature to allow such a
parents' bloodline ....
situation.
95 N.M. at 414, 611 P.2d at 1034.
63. Annot.,60 A.L.R.3d 631, 643-46 (1974).
64. Binavince, supra note 20, at 166-72.
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inheritance from both adoptive and natural lines: " 'It is no part of the
public policy of the state that adoption should operate as an instrumentality
for dual inheritance, with resulting animosity and litigation. . . . [T]he
denial of dual inheritance . . . is not opposed to the public policy of
promoting the welfare of adopted children.' "65 The Holt opinion reaffirms
this position, but does not include any discussion of whether dual inheritance for the stepchild is necessarily inequitable.
Other state courts have upheld dual inheritance by adoptees. The courts
have accepted dual inheritance as an inequality created by statute 66 and
as a statutory right.67 Some courts, construing their state's statutes strictly,
have held that adoption enlarges the adopted child's inheritance rights
without taking away any prior rights. 68 The underlying issue is whether
recognition of an adoptee's inheritance from both natural 69and adopted
bloodlines affords the adopted child preferential treatment.
A determination of the adoption policy in the best interest of the stepparent adoptee should recognize that the child usually has family ties
with three bloodlines. Adoption, in this instance, does not seal off all
contacts between adopted child and the natural lineage. Thus, the compelling reasons under the "new start" adoption policy for denying the
consanguineal basis of intestate inheritance are not applicable.
Stepparent adoption should be viewed as bringing a child into another
family line and adding intestacy rights. Heirship thus follows real familial
65. 83 N.M. 311, 314, 491 P.2d 528, 531 (1971) (quoting Wailes v. Curators of Central College,
254 S.W.2d 645, 649 (1953).
363 Mo. 932, -,
66. In re Bartram's Estate, 109 Kan. 87, 198 P. 192 (1921).
67. Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532 (1879). The Iowa court stated that no natural right to equal
inheritance shares existed under the Descent and Distribution statutes.
68. The Illinois Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Cregar, 30 I11.App. 3d 798, 33 N.E.2d 540
(1975), upheld dual inheritance for claimants as natural niece and nephew and as adopted children.
The court re-affirmed the earlier decision of In re Tilliski's Estate, 390 I11.273, 61 N.E.2d 24
(1945), that an adopted child's right to inherit from natural relatives cannot be cut off unless the
adoption statute expressly severs that right. Finding no clear legislative policy opposed to unequal
shares among nieces and nephews of an intestate, the court rejected the argument that dual inheritance
would be inequitable.
69. The acceptance of dual inheritance in In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257
(1946), provoked this dissent:
If we are concerned primarily with the welfare of the child we must be concerned
with the preservation of these relationships. They cannot exist when the adopted
child gives evidence of such a covetous nature that he would take a dual inheritance
at the expense of these [family relationships].
The desire for more is evidence of greed. Greed is a vicious disease. At first
it develops slowly and is often unobserved. When in its obvious stage it becomes
as malignant as internal cancer. Its germs may spread like a plague. Blight of the
malady is all about us. Surely greed deserves no sustenance from a court of
justice.
Id. at 175, 166 P.2d at 260.
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ties rather than a paradigm limited to one maternal and one paternal line.
Because stepparent adoption usually occurs with the knowledge of the
deceased parental line (or with the consent of the divorced, noncustodial
natural parent), the basis of intestate inheritance should continue to be
consanguinity.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court in In re Estate of Holt denied the
right of a child adopted by her stepfather to inherit through her deceased
natural father. This decision establishes New Mexico adoption policy as
a complete severing of all legal rights, including inheritance rights, between natural parents and the adopted child without any exception for
stepparent adoptees.
Several questions raised in Holt require legislative discussion and decision. First, the ambiguous language of the statutory exception in Section
40-7-15(B)(2) should be rewritten to follow unmistakably the Revised
Uniform Adoption Act model or to identify persons included in the current
general reference to "individual." In Holt, the court's construction of the
statute limits the exception to those few situations where a child is adopted
after a parent's death and the question of whether the child is an heir of
that deceased parent's estate is still pending. °
Second, the legislature and courts must analyze equitable considerations, especially in view of current patterns of marriage, divorce, and
remarriage. New Mexico's adoption policy determines that the interests
of the adopted child are best served by severance of all inheritance rights
from the natural line. This position imposes an unfair result in stepparent
adoptions. If the legislature grants an exception for stepparent adoptees,
then it should make a choice between the situations covered by the Revised
Uniform Adoption Code and those covered by the Uniform Probate Code.
Three typical fact patterns are: (1) a natural parent dies while the parents
are married to each other, the surviving natural parent remarries, and the
new spouse adopts the child; (2) the natural parents are divorced, the
natural parent with custody of the child remarries, the other natural parent
dies, and then the stepparent adopts the child (the situation in Holt); (3)
the natural parents are divorced, the parent with custody of the child
remarries, the stepparent with the consent of the other natural parent
adopts the child, and then the other natural parent dies. The model pro70. For example, in those cases where, following the adoption court action, the court declares a
partial or complete intestacy, the question arises whether the adopted child is still an heir of the
deceased parent's estate. For circumstances in which the adopted child may be entitled to wrongful
death benefits, see Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 745 (1959).
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vision in the Revised Uniform Adoption Act would allow inheritance
through the natural parent in the first and second situations. The model
provision in the Uniform Probate Code would
allow inheritance through
7
the natural parent in all three fact patterns. 1
When the legislature grants an exception, dual inheritance results, and
the adopted stepchild inherits through both natural parents and the stepparent. Statutory recognition of dual inheritance can provoke sharply
differing opinions. The better policy, however, is to permit such dual
inheritance. Although the result in Holt can be avoided by a will of the
natural relative which includes the adopted child, the decision remains
72
important in counseling a stepparent on the legal effects of adoption.
BARBARA C. QUISSELL

71. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Oregon restrict the stepparent exception to (1). An exception
for situations (1) and (2) would permit inheritance through the deceased natural parent. Most generally,
the issue is inheritance from intestate natural grandparents. An exception for (3) would permit
inheritance from, as well as through, the divorced natural parent.
72. Generally, the adoptee's inheritance rights are determined by the law at the time of the death
of the intestate, not at the time of the adoption. Thornberry v. Timmons, 406 S.W.2d 151 (Ky.
1966). New Jersey holds the minority view that the law in effect at the time of adoption governs
an adoptee's right of inheritance. In re Avery, 1976 N.J. Super. 469, 423 A.2d 994 (1980).
Generally, the status of adoption is governed by the law of the state where the adoption was
granted; the inheritance of real property is governed by the law of the state wherein it is situated;
and the distribution of personal property is governed by the laws of the state where the intestate
was domiciled at death. Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 631, 634-35 (1974).

